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Can tariff-jumping foreign investment be beneficial? It is well known that tariff-jumping 
foreign investment is costly. The tax paid by foreign firms may not be sufficient to offset that cost. 
We present a model that incorporates two additional benefits of foreign investment. Being more 
efficient, foreign firms generally pay higher wages than domestic firms and generate spillovers 
that enable domestic firms to become more efficient and competitive. Our analysis suggests that 
attracting foreign investment through import protection can improve welfare if the spillover effect 
is significant. However, once domestic firms have learnt their trade, developing economies should 





In the 1990’s, foreign direct investment became the largest single source of external 
finance for developing countries. In 1997, direct investment accounted for about half of all 
private capital and 40 percent of total capital flows to developing countries (Lipsey (1999)). 
Following the virtual disappearance of commercial bank lending in the 1980’s, emerging 
economies eased restrictions on incoming foreign investment and offered special incentives 
to foreign enterprises - including lower income taxes or income tax holidays, import duty 
exemptions, and subsidies for infrastructure.   
Is such a shift in the policy towards foreign investment sensible? How should the 
welfare impact of foreign investment be evaluated? The early literature on foreign 
investment points out the downside risk of foreign investment in a protected trade regime. 
The so-called tariff-jumping foreign investment, common in many developing economies, 
would actually reduce the welfare of the host economy. This argument against foreign 
investment can be modified if the income of foreign capital is taxed. However, the gain due 
to the corporate income tax paid by foreign capital is likely to be moderate.   
Can tariff-jumping foreign investment improve the welfare of a host economy in ways 
other than the income tax it pays? There are additional benefits within the framework of 
perfect competition, if it is recognized that in a developing economy, foreign firms usually 
possess superior technology in the sense that factors they employ are more productive than 
those in domestic firms. One benefit is that workers employed by foreign firms often receive 
higher wages than those working for domestic firms. The other benefit is that the presence of 
foreign firms often creates a competitive environment in which domestic firms are pressured 
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to improve their productivity. This is often termed as the spillover effect of foreign 
investment. 
The present paper makes an attempt at modeling formally these two benefits of 
tariff-jumping foreign investment. We develop a general equilibrium model with two 
economies, two goods and two factors. The host economy attracts foreign investment with 
import protection as a means to develop the domestic capital-intensive sector. Our main 
interest is to assess to what extent the sum of these two benefits plus the corporate income 
tax paid by foreign firms can outweigh the efficiency loss that has been identified for 
tariff-jumping foreign investment. It is apparent that a search for unambiguous general 
analytical results is likely to be futile. But it is useful to get, at least, a feel for the magnitude 
of the various welfare effects of foreign investment. For that purpose, we make use of 
simulation. 
Our main finding is that the efficiency loss resulting from tariff-jumping foreign 
investment can be sizeable. By themselves, the revenue from corporate income tax and the 
higher wages paid by foreign firms may not be sufficient to offset the cost of tariff-jumping 
foreign investment. However, foreign investment can bring in net benefits if there are 
significant spillovers. Our finding suggests a possible superior dynamic sequence of trade 
and investment policies for a developing economy. Initially when a developing economy 
does not have much of manufacturing industries, a kind of import protection-cum-investment 
incentives may help it to become industrialized. But after domestic firms have learnt their 
trade and become more efficient through the spillover effect of foreign investment, the 
developing economy should liberalize trade to reduce the efficiency loss from tariff-jumping 
foreign investment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review 
of the literature on foreign investment and provides a backdrop for the present paper.  The 
following section presents the complete analytical model. Then, we use simulation to assess 
the likely quantitative importance of various welfare effects of foreign investment under 
discussion. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
How does foreign investment affect the welfare of a host economy? Early models of 
capital movement regard goods trade and capital movement as substitutes for each other. 
This view is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model that relates goods trade to inter-country 
differences in factor endowments. On the one hand, goods trade tends to equalize factor 
prices between economies, reducing the pressure for international factor movement. On the 
other hand, when factors move from where they are abundant to where they are scarce, the 
bases for trade are reduced, or disappear. 
Mundell (1957) first formally analyzes the interaction between import protection and 
capital movement. Invoking the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, Mundell shows that when a 
tariff is imposed by the labor-abundant country, the return to capital is increased, and capital 
moves there; with perfect capital mobility, trade eventually disappears. This type of analysis 
later gave rise to the literature on “tariff-jumping” investment. Major contributions to this 
literature include Johnson (1967), Bhagwati (1973), Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977), XU: CAN TARIFF-JUMPING FOREIGN INVESTMENT BE BENEFICIAL? 
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Jones (1984), and Neary and Ruane (1988). The main insight of this literature is that inflow 
of foreign capital is immiserizing in a trade regime with import protection. 
Attracting foreign investment with import protection is a fairly common policy mix 
among developing economies. Under the import substitution approach to economic 
development, primacy is given to nurturing infant indigenous industries. Foreign investment 
is regarded as a means to this end to the extent that it brings in advanced technologies and 
know-how and transfer them to domestic firms. Though we have mentioned, so far, only the 
import protection in the form of tariffs, there is a wide range of measures that can be adopted, 
in practice, to promote industrialization. Typically, a foreign investment approval procedure 
is instituted to limit the number of foreign firms and to pick the projects that are most likely 
to transfer the desired technology and know-how to the host economy. Often a “priority 
industry” test is used to judge whether a potential foreign investment project is capable of 
bringing new technologies and new products to the economy. In fact, many host economies 
following this policy paradigm do not just passively review project proposals, they actively 
solicit the kind of investments that would benefit them.   
Models of tariff-jumping foreign investment usually do not assume that the host 
country taxes the income of foreign capital. Bond (1991) has argued that an inflow of foreign 
investment need not be immiserizing if the host economy can tax the income of foreign 
capital. He develops a general equilibrium model with foreign capital taxation for a small 
economy (“small” both in goods and capital markets). He finds that the optimal import tariff 
for a small host economy is positive when the importable good is capital-intensive and the 
tax paid in the home country is credited in the home economy of foreign capital. 
Though the corporate income tax paid by foreign capital is clearly a benefit, it may not 
be, for two reasons, large enough to outweigh the welfare loss of foreign investment in a 
protected trade regime. On the one hand, the ability of developing economies to tax the 
income of foreign capital is severely constrained in today’s world of foot-loose capital 
movement. Developing economies are, in general, cornered into a no-win situation of tax 
competition. They have to compete against one another by offering t ax incentives. 
Multinational firms can easily resort to transfer pricing to evade their tax liabilities. 
Therefore, there exists a very low ceiling for the corporate income tax rate that developing 
economies can enforce effectively. On the other hand, the income tax paid by foreign firms 
does not constitute a net benefit because foreign firms also benefit from and consume their 
share of the public good, especially infrastructure, provided by the government of the host 
economy. Therefore, the gross benefit of the corporate income tax should be offset by the 
cost of providing the necessary public service to foreign firms. It is not uncertain whether 
foreign capital has paid its fair share of the cost of proving public service and infrastructure 
through its income tax. Therefore, it is questionable whether Bond’s argument can make 
tariff-jumping foreign investment not “immiserizing”.   
Does foreign investment bring other benefits that could outweigh the welfare cost of 
foreign investment in a protected trade regime? Without getting into the complicated world 
of imperfect competition, two major benefits of foreign investment have long been 
recognized, at least informally. One benefit is that foreign firms tend to pay higher wages 
than domestic firms do. In this way, the host economy shares part of the productivity gain 
imparted by foreign investment. The other benefit is the spillovers of foreign investment, i.e., JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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the efficiency gains among domestic firms resulting from the increased competition in 
domestic markets from the entry of foreign-owned firms. Foreign competition promotes 
more rapid adoption of new technology and best-practice management techniques on the part 
of domestic firms through demonstration effects, vertical linkages and so forth. When 
foreign firms introduce new products or processes to the domestic market, domestic firms 
may benefit from the accelerated diffusion of new technology (Teece (1977)). In some cases, 
domestic firms may increase productivity simply by observing nearby foreign firms. In other 
cases, diffusion may occur from labor turnover as domestic employees move from foreign to 
domestic firms. Foreign firms often provide more on-the-job training programs than their 
domestic counterparts (Gonclaves (1986)). The key to appreciate these two benefits is to 
recognize a stylized fact: foreign firms usually have the competitive edge of a superior 
technology. In other words, factors can be made more productive in the hands of foreign 
firms than in those of domestic firms, especially in a developing economy.   
The available evidence (e.g., Globerman et al.  (1994)) is consistent in showing that 
foreign firms tend to have higher average labor-productivity levels than domestic firms do. 
There is ample evidence of the spillovers of foreign investment. Caves (1974) has found that 
the positive disparity between foreign and domestic value added per worker disappeared as 
foreign firms employed an increasing share of the labor in the sector, which is consistent 
with the spillover hypothesis. In a similar study using cross-section sectoral data for 
Canadian manufacturing industries in 1972, Globerman (1979) has found a weak spillover 
effect. Blomstrom and Persson (1983), Blonstrom (1986), Blomstrom (1989) have found that 
in Mexico, sectors with higher foreign ownership exhibited higher levels of productivity, 
faster productivity growth, and faster convergence of productivity to U.S. norms. However, 
empirical evidence is not always clear-cut. In a recent study, Aitken and Harrison (1999) has 
found, using panel data on Venezuelan plants, that foreign equity participation is positively 
correlated with plant productivity (the “own-plant” effect), but foreign investment negatively 
affects the productivity of domestically owned plants. 
 
III. The Model 
 
To recapture the above discussion, the distinction of the present model is to 
incorporate the two benefits of foreign investment that have not received due recognition in 
theoretical models. It is assumed that foreign firms possess a superior technology. One 
benefit is that foreign firms pay a higher wage than domestic firms do so that the host 
economy can share part of the productivity gain. The other benefit is that the inflow of 
foreign investment may generate spillovers in the form of pushing up the productivity of 
domestic firms. 
Consider a world that consists of a developing economy (home) and a developed 
economy (foreign). The developed economy is both more abundantly endowed with capital 
and more advanced technologically. Therefore, the developed economy exports the 
capital-intensive good in exchange for the labor-intensive imports from the developing 
economy. Furthermore, there is a movement of capital from the developed economy to the 
developing economy. 
We make use of the classical trade model that is characterized by perfect competition XU: CAN TARIFF-JUMPING FOREIGN INVESTMENT BE BENEFICIAL? 
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and trade in homogeneous goods. Under perfect competition, prices are set by unit costs. 
Technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas unit cost function. Let  i p  and  i S ,  i = 1,2, 
be the price and supply (produced by domestic firms) of the two goods,  w  and  r  be the 
wage rate and the rental rate,  t  be the tariff rate on the imports of the capital-intensive good 
in the developing economy. The perfect competition conditions for the two sectors in the 
developing economy are: 
 
( ) 0 , 0 ,
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 = - ‡ =
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These two conditions are specified in a general way to encompass the possibility of 
complete specialization. One of  1 S  and  2 S  may be zero in equilibrium. 
Full employment of factors gives the other set of equilibrium conditions on the supply 
side. I n the presence of foreign investment, the developing economy consists of two 
sub-economies: one for domestic firms and the other for foreign firms. Let  L and  K  be 
the supplies of labor and capital of the developing economy, 
*
H L  be the labor employed by 
foreign firms. The labor (capital) demand per unit of output is equal to the derivative of the 
unit cost function with respect to the wage rate and the rental rate. The factor market 
equilibrium conditions for domestic firms are: 
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H w  be the wage rate that foreign firms pay to workers in the developing economy. 
It is assumed that 
*
H w  is equal to or greater than w. Formally, the relation is specified by: 
 
1 ,
* £ = b b w wH                                                      (5) 
 
For the moment let us treat  b  a s an exogenous parameter. In practice, it would be 
determined by the general condition of demand and supply in the labor market. The larger 
the incoming foreign investment is, the stronger the demand for local labor by foreign firms, 
and the smaller  b  would be. 
Let 
*
2 A ( 2 A £ ) be the productivity coefficient for foreign firms producing good 2. 
Under perfect competition, we have: 
 
2 2 * 1 * *
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This equation determines 
*
H r  in terms of 
*
H w  and  2 ) 1 ( p t + . Perfect competition 
entails that the ratio of the labor income share to the capital income share is given by the 
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Then (7) determines 
*
H L  in terms of 
*
H K  for given 
*
H w  and 
*
H r . The last element 
for specifying the foreign-owned sub-economy is the output of good 2 produced by foreign 
firms in the developing economy, which is denoted by 
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2H S  is proportional to 
*
H K . 
The specification of the developed economy is similar to that of the domestic-owned 
sub-economy in the developing economy. Let ‘*’ denote the corresponding variables for the 
developed economy. The supply side of the developed economy consists of the following 
four equations: 
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Having specified the supply side of the model, we turn to the demand side. The income 
of the developing economy consists of four distinct components as specified below: 
 
( ) ( )
* * * *
2 2 2
*
H H H H H K r L w S D tp rK L L w Y t + + - + + - =                          (13) 
 
The first two terms are the labor and capital income generated by domestic firms. The 
third term is import tariff revenue. The forth term is the wages of the workers employed by 
foreign firms. The last term is the corporate income tax paid by foreign firms, where  t is 
the corporate income tax rate. In comparison, the income of the developed economy is much 
simpler. XU: CAN TARIFF-JUMPING FOREIGN INVESTMENT BE BENEFICIAL? 
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* * * * * * * * ) 1 ( ) ( H H H K r K K r L w Y t - + - + =                                    (14) 
 
Preferences are represented by a simple Cobb-Douglas utility function. In other words, 
the expenditure shares for the two goods are constant. Let  q be the expenditure share for 
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According to Walras’ law, the world equilibrium can be given by the balance between 
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The system of equations from (1) to (19) forms a complete set that must be solved 
together to determine the equilibrium values of  1 p ,  2 p , 
*
H w , 
* w ,  r , 
*
H r , 
* r ,  1 S ,  2 S , 
*
2H S , 
*
1 S , 
*
2 S ,  Y , 
* Y ,  1 D ,  2 D , 
*
1 D , 
*
2 D , 
*
H L . In solving the model, we set  1 = w   and 
designate the unit of the labor in the developing economy as the numéraire. Once the 
endogenous variables are solved, trade balance and the welfare levels of the two economies 
can be computed as follows: 
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Apart from the specification of the foreign-owned sub-economy in the developing 
economy, the present model is a standard 2-country, 2-goods, and 2-factors trade model. The JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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novelty of the present model lies in the way in which foreign investment is specified. Here, 
we deliberately confine foreign investment to the import-competing sector (good 2). In 
contrast, most models in the existing literature depict foreign investment simply as an 
addition to the supply of local capital without specifying a separate foreign-owned sector.   
Our modeling choice is motivated by three considerations. First, the specification of a 
separate foreign-owned sub-economy in the developing economy is necessitated by the 
assumption that foreign firms enjoy a technological advantage against domestic firms. 
Second, we want to focus on the effects of the tariff-jumping foreign investment that 
substitutes the imports of good 2 in the developing economy. This is the kind of foreign 




Another feature that simplifies our analysis is that we deliberately treat the volume of 
foreign investment (
*
H K ) and the wage premium factor paid by foreign firms,  b  in (5), as 
exogenous. We could have modeled foreign investment as an endogenous variable, being a 
positive function of the after-tax return on capital or in the case of perfect capital movement 
which entails equalization of after-tax returns on capital between the two economies (given 
that the tax credit feature is not incorporated). But we must cope with an arbitrary choice of 
how to calibrate the supply function of foreign capital. But even though inflow of foreign 
capital is treated as exogenous, we can easily show how the model would behave when the 
supply of foreign capital becomes more or less elastic with respect to the return on capital. A 
simple technique that we use here is to carry out two simulations with two different volumes 
of foreign investment. From the comparison of such two simulation results, we can infer the 
consequences of a more or less elastic supply of foreign capital. Similarly, we could have 
modeled  b  as a negative function of the volume of foreign investment. In other words, the 
wage premium becomes larger, the more foreign capital moves in. That relation appears to 
be sensible, but it is just as ad hoc as treating  b  as exogenous. In short, the present model 
could have been extended easily by incorporating an endogenous foreign investment and an 
endogenous wage premium paid by foreign firms in the developing economies. As a matter 
of fact, we present a specific example of such extension in our simulation reported below. 
 
 
1. In principle, we could have designed a more general specification of the foreign-owned sub-economy that allows 
foreign firms to produce the exportable (good 1), too. This is also a relevant feature of the real world. In fact, 
much of the foreign investment in developing economies flows into the export sector. However, if we do that, we 
have to cope with the entailed complication of whether the foreign-owned sub-economy in the developing 
economy and the developed economy would be diversified in producing both goods or specialized in producing 
only one of the two goods. With the same technology but different factor prices, it is not possible that both 
economies would be diversified in producing the two goods. It would be very tedious and distracting to track 
down the three distinct possibilities: 1) the foreign-owned sub-economy is specialized in producing good 2 and 
the developed economy is diversified (the present model), 2) the foreign-owned sub-economy is diversified and 
the developed economy is specialized in producing good 2, 3) the foreign-owned sub-economy is specialized in 
producing good 1 and the developed economy is specialized in producing good 2. XU: CAN TARIFF-JUMPING FOREIGN INVESTMENT BE BENEFICIAL? 
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IV. Simulation Results 
 
The benchmark equilibrium is specified as follows. We make the developing economy 
as the reference point for comparison. In the closed economy equilibrium, the developing 
economy produces and consumes 100 units of both goods. To make good 2 more 
capital-intensive than good 1, it is assumed that  3 . 0 1 = a  and  7 . 0 2 = a . In the benchmark 
equilibrium, we set  1 = w  and  1 . 0 = r . Accordingly, it is derived that  995 . 1 1= A  and 
012 . 5 2= A . And the required factor supplies are:  100 = L  and  1000 = K . The implied  q 
is 0.5. 
The developed economy is more capital-abundant. Without complicating the analysis 
with the size issue, it is assumed that the developed economy has the same size of labor 
supply:  100
* = L , but three times more capital:  000 , 3
* = K . Further, it is assumed that 




1 1 = = A A A A .
2   
The simulation results are reported in Table 1. The variables are arranged in rows and 
simulation results in columns. The symbols for each variable are the same as defined in 
equations 1-22. Exogenous variables and parameters are shown above endogenous variables 
so that it is easy to relate the change in endogenous variables to the change in exogenous 
variables. The environment for each simulation is specified by a mix of the five exogenous 
variables and parameters:  b ,  1 A ,  2 A ,  t ,  t, and 
*
H K . The benchmark equilibrium is a 
free-trade equilibrium without capital movement, reported in the S1 column (Simulation 1). 
In this equilibrium, the developing economy exports good 1 and imports good 2 with a trade 
balance of 68.18 (in terms of the numéraire, home labor because of  1 = w ). Note that under 
free trade, the output of good 2 ( 2 S ) in the developing economy is only 7.89 (%) of that (i.e., 
100) of the closed economy equilibrium. The welfare level (U ) of the developing economy 
under free trade is 107.87. Compared to the welfare of a closed economy ( 100 = U ), free 
trade brings a sizeable gain (7.87%). This benchmark equilibrium exemplifies a typical 
situation for many developing economies that wish to embark on industrialization. 
Now let us assume that the developing economy desires to promote the 
import-competing sector with import tariffs. A 20% tariff, the average import tariff rate 
among developing economies, is levied on the imports of the capital-intensive good. The 
results are reported as Simulation 2 shown in the S2 column. The effect of the 20% import 
tariff is to boost the domestic production ( 2 S ) of good 2 from 7.89 to 48.51. With the 
imposition of the import tariff, the developing economy still imports the capital-intensive 
good, but the value of the imported capital-intensive good ( 2 2X p ) shrinks from 68.18 to 
42.17. Because the two economies are equal in terms of labor force, neither of the two can be 
 
2. Though the present study assumes that the technological gaps are equal in both sectors, this is not the only 




1 / / A A A A ‡ . In other words, the comparative 
advantage in trade can also be due to the Ricardian type of technological differences between the two economies. 
The comparative advantage of the developed economy in producing good 2 may also be due to a relative 
technological superiority. Nevertheless, our current choice looks as good as any other alternative. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
  10 
regarded as a small open economy. Both have some influence over the terms of trade. Since 
free trade is not optimal for either of the two economies, the optimal tariff rate is positive. In 
the present case, the use of the import tariff actually raises the welfare of the developing 
economy marginally from 107.87 to 108.02, and reduces the welfare of the developed 
economy from 262.94 to 260.85. The gain in welfare for the developing economy is solely 
due to the improvement in the terms of trade ( 2 1/ p p ) from 1.37 to 1.44. Nevertheless, 
import protection creates a costly distortion. 
As is described by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, import protection affects factor 
prices. In the present case, a 20% increase in the domestic price of the capital-intensive good 
raises the domestic rental rate from 0.045 to 0.063, an increase of 40%. Now, the 
import-substitution regime in the developing economy becomes attractive to foreign 
investment. Besides, the developing economy may also desire to attract foreign investment in 
an attempt to develop its sector 2. So let us consider the effects of foreign investment. 
Two simulations are computed respectively with  150
* = H K , 300, or respectively 5% 
and 10% of the capital supply of the developed economy. It helps to regard these two inflows 
of foreign investment as if they were derived from two capital supply functions with 
different elasticities with respect to the return on capital. Therefore, a comparison of the two 
simulation results can show how the elasticity of foreign investment with respect to the 
return on capital would affect the behavior of the model. The two simulations are reported 
Simulations 3 and 4 shown in the S3 and S4 columns. To proceed step by step, we assume, in 
computing these two simulations, that foreign firms pay the same wage rate as domestic 
firms. In other words,  1 = b , which is the usual setting analyzed in the existing literature. As 
is well known, such tariff-jumping foreign investment reduces welfare. Compared to the 
results of Simulation 2, the welfare of the developing economy is reduced from 108.02 to 
105.06 in the case of  150
* = H K and to 102.16 in the case of  300
* = H K . Apparently, the 
more foreign capital moves in, the worse off the developing economy becomes.   
However, it is important to observe that foreign investment improves world efficiency 
in this case. With a superior technology, foreign firms have made the labor they employ in 
the developing economy more productive. It is just that the developed economy captures all 
the efficiency gain in this case. Compared to the results of Simulation 2, the welfare of the 
developed economy increases from 260.85 to 265.15 in the case of  150
* = H K  and to 269.40 
in the case of  300
* = H K . 
As is intended, sector 2 of the developing economy expands. As shown in the row for 
*
2H S , foreign firms produce 33.11 units of good 2 in Simulation 3 and 65.90 in Simulation 4. 
Interestingly, the output of good 2 produced by domestic firms (shown in the row for  2 S ) 
also increases slightly in both cases. In other words, such tariff-jumping foreign investment 
mainly substitutes the imports of good 2 from the developed economy. As shown in the row 
for  2 2X p , the developing economy remains to be an importer of the capital-intensive good 
in Simulation 3, though the value of imports is down to 17.0. In contrast, in Simulation 4, the 
volume (300) of capital inflow is large enough to turn the developing economy from an 
importer of good 2 into an exporter of good 2. In fact, the developing economy now exports 
both goods: 25.23 for the value of exporting good 1 and 7.35 for the value of exporting good XU: CAN TARIFF-JUMPING FOREIGN INVESTMENT BE BENEFICIAL? 
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2. The trade surplus of 32.58 is used to pay the repatriated income of foreign capital. 
So far, these results are well known. Now let us introduce the additional benefits of 
foreign investment incorporated in the present model. First, we introduce the feature of the 
wage premium paid by foreign firms. To demonstrate this possibility, it is assumed that the 
wage rate paid by foreign firms is 10% higher than that paid by domestic firms. In other 
words, 91 . 0 1 . 1 / 1 = = b . Again, two simulations are computed for  150
* = H K and  300
* = H K . 
The results are reported as Simulations 5 and 6 shown in the S5 and S6 columns. Since part 
of the efficiency gain resulting from foreign investment is now passed onto local labor in the 
form of higher wages, the welfare of the developing economy gains somewhat. Comparing 
Simulation 5 to Simulation 3 and Simulation 6 to Simulation 4, the welfare of the developing 
economy has increased marginally from 105.06 to 105.57 in the case of  150
* = H K and from 
102.16 to 103.15 in the case of  300
* = H K . In absolute terms, the gain in welfare is not very 
large. This is because the labor employed by foreign firms accounts for only 6.22 (%) and 
12.29 (%) of the labor force in the developing economy respectively. The benefit from the 
wage premium can be easily approximated using the formula: the gain (%) = the wage 
premium (%) times the share in GNP of the wage income of the workers employed by 
foreign firms. 
Although the 10% wage premium we have set is just an illustration, it is chosen on the 
basis of an intuitive feel for what is realistic in the real world. Theoretically, the wage 
premium can go up all the way to 50%, since by assumption, workers employed by foreign 
firms are now 50% more productive as a result of the superior technology in comparison 
with those working in domestic firms. But in practice, it is more likely that the bargaining 
power of local workers is much weaker than that of foreign firms so that the latter captures 
most of the rent. Though the number is chosen arbitrarily, it is still informative to observe 
that the gain from the wage premium at 10% is not sufficient to outweigh the welfare loss 
due to foreign investment in a protected trade regime. Comparing Simulations 5 and 6 to 
Simulation 2, the welfare (105.57 and 103.15) of the developing economy with foreign 
investment is still less than that (108.02) without foreign investment. Of course, the higher 
the wage premium is, the more welfare gain the developing economy would enjoy. 
To further boost the benefit of foreign investment, we next introduce the corporate tax 
levied on the income of foreign firms. It is assumed that corporate income tax is collected at 
the rate of 30%, a fairly high estimate of what developing economies can effectively enforce. 
Similarly, two simulations are computed for two levels of foreign investment:  300 , 150
* = H K . 
The results are reported as Simulations 7 and 8 shown in the columns of S7 and S8. In 
comparison, the corporate income tax appears to be a more sizeable benefit for the host 
country. Comparing Simulation 7 to Simulation 5 and Simulation 8 to Simulation 6, the 
welfare of the developing economy increases from 105.57 to 108.90 in the case of 
150
* = H K , and from 103.15 to 109.77 in the case of  300
* = H K . Clearly, when corporate 
income tax is collected, more foreign investment is better than less.   
However, this result must be qualified. As discussed in the preceding section, this tax 
benefit of foreign investment should be offset by the cost of providing public service 
consumed by foreign firms. If that factor is incorporated, the net gain for the host economy 
may not be positive. Furthermore, developing economies are usually compelled to compete JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
  12 
with one another for foreign investment with tax incentives. Accordingly, the effective tax 
rate may not be as high as 30%. In view of this consideration, the tax benefit from foreign 
investment is likely to be marginal. In short, it is probable that the sum of the two benefits 
analyzed above may be modest in magnitude, not sufficient to offset the negative influence 
imparted by trade distortion. 
Now, we proceed to evaluate the main theme of the present paper. As a result of the 
competition from foreign firms and the spillover effect, domestic firms may manage to 
improve their efficiency. Specifically, we consider the case that the efficiency of domestic 
firms increases by 10%. Again, let us proceed step by step. First we consider the case that 
1 A  and  2 A  are reduced by 10%, but foreign and domestic firms pay the same wage rate. 
In other words,  b  is now set to be one. Two simulations are computed for  300 , 150
* = H K . 
The results are reported as Simulations 9 and 10 shown in the columns of S9 and S10. 
Comparing Simulation 9 to Simulation 7 and Simulation 10 to Simulation 8, the welfare of 
the developing economy is now raised from 108.90 to 118.97 in the case of  150
* = H K  and 
from 109.77 to 119.33 in the case of  300
* = H K . Approximately, the increase in welfare is 
proportional to the improvement in factor productivity. It is apparent that the spillover effect 
may well be much larger than the benefits that have been considered above. In other words, 
the most important benefit of foreign (direct) investment is likely to be this spillover effect. 
Through contacts with the more advanced and efficient operations of foreign firms, domestic 
firms can close the technology gap more effectively. 
To complete our story, we restore the 10% wage premium paid by foreign firms. The 
results are reported as Simulations 11 and 12 shown in the columns of S11 and S12. The 
wage premium provides an additional benefit so that the welfare of the developing economy 
is further raised. Comparing Simulation 11 to Simulation 9 and Simulation 12 to Simulation 
10, the welfare of the developing economy is now raised from 118.97 to 119.33 in the case 
of  150
* = H K  and from 119.33 to 120.15 in the case of  300
* = H K . 
To sum up the main results of our simulation, import protection in the presence of 
foreign investment can be costly. A 20% tariff rate on the imports of good 2 raises the return 
on foreign capital by 38% (the percentage increase in 
*
H r  from 0.081 in Simulation 1 to 
0.112 in Simulation 2) through a channel similar to the Stolper-Samuelson effect. This is a 
sizeable subsidy to foreign capital. Our simulation also shows that the benefits from the 
corporate income tax and the wage premium paid by foreign firms are likely to be modest 
and may not be large enough to offset the efficiency loss of tariff-jumping foreign 
investment. A more persuasive argument for attracting foreign investment in the presence of 
import protection is the spillover effect of foreign investment. Only when the inflow of 
foreign investment leads to significant productivity gains in domestic firms through 
spillovers can tariff-jumping foreign investment be rationalized. This conclusion supports the 
common practice in many developing economies that tie investment incentives to technology 
transfer and limit the pace and extent of foreign investment to a level that does not critically 
cripple domestic firms. In other words, foreign investment serves as a means to attain the aim 
of making domestic firms productive and competitive. 
As mentioned in the introduction, a current policy issue for many developing XU: CAN TARIFF-JUMPING FOREIGN INVESTMENT BE BENEFICIAL? 
  13 
economies i s whether trade liberalization in the presence of tariff-jumping foreign 
investment would be welfare-enhancing. To answer this question, we assume that the 
developing economy reduces the import tariff rate from 20% to zero and as a result of the 
decline in the rental rate, the stock of foreign investment falls back from 300 to 150. We also 
assume that the 10% efficiency gain in domestic firms is not reduced when some of foreign 
investment pulls out. This is a realistic feature. The last simulation is reported as Simulation 
13 shown in the S13 column. Comparing Simulation 13 to Simulation 12, trade liberalization 
in the presence of tariff-jumping foreign investment can actually improve efficiency. The 
welfare level of the developing economy increases from 120.15 to 121.09. The reduction in 
foreign investment has two offsetting effects on the welfare of the developing economy. On 
the one hand, the developing economy gains from a reduction in the efficiency loss from 
tariff-jumping foreign investment, on the other hand, it loses some corporate income tax and 
the wage premium earned by workers employed in foreign firms. Theoretically, the net 
welfare effect is ambiguous, though it is positive in our specific example. 
Of course, what we have here is only a specific example, which is not sufficient to 
draw some general results. However, this example does suggest a possible superior dynamic 
sequence of trade and investment policies for a developing economy. When a developing 
economy does not have much of manufacturing industries initially, specialization in 
exporting primary commodities under free trade may not offer enough potential for sustained 
growth. Therefore, some import protection-cum-investment incentives may help it to become 
industrialized. However, after domestic firms become more efficient through learning and 
under the pressure of foreign competition, it may be to the advantage of that developing 
economy to embark on a path of trade liberalization that can reduce the efficiency loss from 
tariff-jumping foreign investment. 
For the curiosity of illustrating this idea, we extend the present model by endogenizing 
capital inflow (
*
H K ), wage premium ( b ), the productivity levels of domestic firms ( 1 A  a nd 
2 A ). We assume for simplicity that  b ,  1 A  and  2 A  are negative linear functions of 
*
H K . 
In turn, 
*
H K  is a positive linear function of the rental rate differential (
* * r rH - ). These four 
additional functions are calibrated such that under free trade, the equilibrium is the same as 
Simulation 1 and with 20% tariffs on the imports of good 2, the resulting equilibrium is the 
same as Simulation 12. In other words, as  t  increases from 0.00 to 0.20, 
*
H K  increases 
from 0 to 300,  b  decreases from 1.00 to 0.91,  1 A  and  2 A  decrease from 1.995 and 
5.012 to 1.814 and 4.556 respectively. The main insight of the simulation is show by Figure 
1. In that figure, both capital inflow (left axis) and welfare (right axis) are plotted against the 
import tariff rate. The line labeled as welfare with increasing tariffs refers to the welfare for 
the case in which  1 A  and  2 A  decrease with the increase in 
*
H K . As can be seen, as  t  
increases from 0.00 to 0.20, 
*
H K  increases from 0 to 300 and welfare increases from 
107.872 to 120.152. The main contribution to the welfare increase is the spillover effect of 
foreign investment on the productivity of domestic firms. Next, we reverse the orientation of 
trade policy but assume that the productivity gain attained by domestic firms does not 
dissipate with a withdrawal of foreign investment. The resulting welfare is labeled as welfare 
with decreasing tariffs. As illustrated by Figure 1, a reduction in the l evel of import JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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protection can raise welfare. In our simulation, welfare reaches an approximate peak 
(120.721) at  t  = 0.15. This optimal tariff rate is computed for the case in which the tax 
benefit (at 30%) from foreign investment is not offset by the cost of public spending foreign 
firms should share. If we reduce the net tax benefit from foreign investment, the optimal 




In the present paper, we have presented a model of f oreign investment relevant to 
developing economies. The distinction of the present model is to incorporate two additional 
benefits of foreign investment: the spillover effect and the wage premium effect of foreign 
investment on top of the tax revenue effect of foreign investment. The present model 
provides a useful conceptual framework to evaluate the benefits of foreign investment 
against the cost of trade-distorting import protection. Though the results of our simulation 
are not sufficient to establish a  general proposition, they do spotlight a main insight: 
spillovers are likely to be the most important benefit that can potentially rationalize 
tariff-jumping foreign investment. The income taxes paid by foreign firms, by themselves, 
are not likely to justify the efficiency loss due to the distortion of import protection. Put it 
differently, foreign investment, even though it is costly, can be an effective means to shake 
up less efficient domestic firms and force them to improve their competitiveness through 
learning and competition. In essence, the implicit subsidy to foreign investment through 
import restrictions is a price paid to acquire advanced technologies and modern management. 
How effective can such a strategy of industrialization be for developing economies? There 
has been mixed evidence. The experiences of Japan and Korea demonstrate that foreign 
investment is not essential to domestic industrialization. With wise government guidance, 
domestic firms can grow up under important protection (the infant-industry argument) and 
expand into export markets. But on the other hand, the experiences of the second-tier East 
Asian newly industrializing economies such as Malaysia, Thailand, and China have shown 
that foreign investment can play a vital role in forcing domestic firms to become more 
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Table 1   Simulation Results 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13
Exogenous variables
Wage premium b 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91 0.91
Cost function scalar, sector 1, home A
1 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.81 1.81 1.81 1.81 1.81
Cost function scalar, sector 2, home A 2 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 5.01 4.56 4.56 4.56 4.56 4.56
Import tariff rate t 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00
Tax rate on the income of foreign capital t 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Inflow of foreign capital, home K*H 0 0 150 300 150 300 150 300 150 300 150 300 150
Endogenous variables
Utility, home U 107.87 108.02 105.06 102.16 105.57 103.15 108.90 109.77 118.97 119.44 119.33 120.15 121.09
Utility, foreign U* 262.94 260.85 265.15 269.40 264.75 268.61 261.41 261.97 261.53 262.07 261.27 261.54 261.55
Exports of good 1, home X
1 86.38 48.46 38.76 29.29 39.58 30.85 36.63 25.02 39.55 27.39 40.43 29.05 80.70
Imports of good 2, home X 2 118.40 70.00 28.55 -12.49 30.72 -8.28 34.48 -0.76 38.42 2.45 40.32 6.14 96.08
Value of home exports of good 1 p
1X
1 68.18 42.17 33.56 25.23 34.31 26.64 31.75 21.60 31.27 21.56 32.00 22.92 58.24
Value of home imports of good 2 p 2X 2 68.18 42.17 17.00 -7.35 18.34 -4.90 20.58 -0.45 21.00 1.33 22.10 3.34 50.97
Payment for foreign capital (1-t)r *HK*H 0.00 0.00 16.56 32.58 15.97 31.55 11.17 22.05 10.26 20.23 9.89 19.58 7.27
Supply of good 1, home S
1 178.51 146.91 134.20 121.78 135.56 124.40 135.63 124.55 147.94 135.88 149.23 138.37 184.52
Supply of good 2, home S 2 7.89 48.51 53.99 59.42 53.57 58.59 53.49 58.43 60.25 65.47 59.88 64.74 17.17
Supply of good 2, foreign firms S*
2H 0.00 0.00 33.11 65.90 31.83 63.42 31.82 63.40 31.92 63.57 30.68 61.17 27.98
Supply of good 1, foreign S 1* 138.20 168.57 181.12 193.39 180.16 191.55 180.30 191.83 177.95 189.93 177.03 188.18 143.55
Supply of good 2, foreign S 2* 426.25 383.52 348.30 313.45 349.70 316.14 349.49 315.73 352.90 318.50 354.22 321.04 401.14
The price of good 1 p
1 0.789 0.870 0.866 0.862 0.867 0.864 0.867 0.863 0.790 0.787 0.791 0.789 0.722
The price of good 2 p 2 0.576 0.602 0.595 0.589 0.597 0.592 0.597 0.592 0.547 0.541 0.548 0.544 0.531
The rental rate, home r 0.045 0.063 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.063 0.062 0.063 0.062 0.046
The wage rate, foreign firms w*H 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.000 1.000 1.100 1.100 1.100
The rental rate, foreign firms r* H 0.081 0.112 0.110 0.109 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.105 0.098 0.096 0.094 0.093 0.069
The wage rate, foreign w* 1.500 1.720 1.720 1.720 1.720 1.720 1.720 1.720 1.563 1.563 1.563 1.563 1.364
The rental rate, foreign r* 0.068 0.069 0.067 0.066 0.068 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.063
Tariff revenue tp1X
1 0.00 8.43 3.40 -1.47 3.67 -0.98 4.12 -0.09 4.20 0.27 4.42 0.67 0.00
Corporate income tax t r *HK *H 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.79 9.45 4.40 8.67 4.24 8.39 3.12
Income, home Y 145.45 171.33 165.26 159.38 166.42 161.63 171.61 171.89 171.35 170.78 172.22 172.50 149.85
Income, foreign Y* 354.55 377.69 380.74 383.69 380.99 384.20 376.06 374.47 343.86 342.07 344.22 342.77 323.69
Demand for good 1, home D 1 92.13 98.45 95.44 92.50 95.98 93.56 99.00 99.54 108.38 108.49 108.80 109.32 103.82
Demand for good 2, home D
2 126.30 118.51 115.65 112.83 116.11 113.73 119.79 121.06 130.59 131.49 130.88 132.06 141.23
Demand for good 1, foreign D*1 224.58 217.03 219.88 222.67 219.73 222.40 216.94 216.85 217.50 217.31 217.46 217.23 224.25
Demand for good 2, foreign D*2 307.85 313.52 319.75 325.94 318.98 324.42 315.00 316.49 314.48 316.05 313.90 314.90 305.07
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Figure 1  The Effects of Import Tariffs on Capital Inflow and Welfare 